Was YOUR vote counted? (feat. homomorphic encryption) - Numberphile

Channel:Numberphile · Length:8:34 · Published:2016-11-07 · Views:198058

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Summary

Numberphile interviews cryptographer Ron Rivest about end-to-end verifiable voting. He explains how homomorphic encryption and receipts let a voter confirm their ballot was counted without being able to prove how they voted to anyone else.

Why HN recommends it

HN commenters point to it in election-security threads as an accessible explainer of how a vote can be verifiable but not sellable.

Cryptographers are clever and have figured out a way to let you know your vote was counted without being able to prove it to a third party! — HN, 2024

Cryptography · Recreational & visual math · US politics & elections

Subtitles (excerpt)

Asked me to talk a little bit about the new innovations in voting systems. And so I'd like to tell you about end-to-end verifiable voting systems, which is the buzzword that academics are using to describe this. Now,Which means really that you can verify the whole flow of information, from your head, as to who you think you want to vote for, all the way through the casting of the vote and the tabulation and then the final tally, so that you can verify that every step of the way is going the way it should and that your vote counts the way you intended, that the final result is the accurate representation of everybody's votes. And right now, with many voting systems, you can have a certain amount of verifiability. The lovely thing about paper ballots is that you can see that, you know, what you wrote down is what you intended. And so that's a very important property, very nice. But once you've cast the paper ballot, you're trusting the chain of custody of those paper ballots to make sure that the count is done right and that the ballots being counted are the right ones. Brady: "Talk to me about this selfie thing. Some people like to take a photo of their ballot, don't they?" Yeah, it's a lot of fun, and I think it may increase voter participation

On Hacker News

Cryptographers are clever and have figured out a way to let you know your vote was counted without being able to prove it to a third party! [VIDEO] — c1ccccc1, 2024-11
> I've seen many proposed implementations but they all fail because if I can prove my vote to myself in any way, someone else can make me prove it to them either to buy or coerce my ballot. There is a way to prove that your vote was counted without being able to prove what you voted for by using homomorphic encryption. So, if someone wanted to coerce you or pay you for voting at all for whomever … — PyroLagus, 2019-06
The mechanism for voter verification is based on homomorphic encryption. Numberphile made a video on this topic recently, with a few basic explainers: [VIDEO] — YokoZar, 2019-05
Right - the way you verify that is by asking for 100 sealed Alice envelopes, and opening 99 of them at random. If the machine was trying to trick you, you have a strong chance of catching it. You still walk out with a sealed envelope, and the would-be vote-buyer can't be sure it isn't a Bob envelope. This Numberphile video explains the process a bit more: [VIDEO] — YokoZar, 2019-05
I find Rivest's video( [VIDEO] ) on homomorphic encryption as voting mechanism quite interesting. It looks more secure than pen and paper. All user get a receipt which they can verify is same during vote counting. They themselves can vote count using all others receipt. At the same time, they can't sell their vote as it's encrypted. — khrm, 2017-08

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