The Memory Sinkhole - Unleashing An X86 Design Flaw Allowing Universal Privilege Escalation

Channel:Black Hat · Length:46:33 · Published:2015-12-29 · Views:169380

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Summary

Christopher Domas's Black Hat 2015 talk on a long-unnoticed x86 design flaw that lets an attacker reach System Management Mode, a ring below the OS. It explains how the legacy architecture allows universal privilege escalation and persistent, hard-to-detect malware.

Why HN recommends it

Cited in discussions of CPU hidden features, Intel's security failures and SMM malware as a concrete example of a forgotten processor feature being exploited.

There was a blackhat talk on embedding malware in SMM and triggering it with a magic number written to a register — HN, 2017

Security & hacking · Computer architecture & CPUs

Subtitles (excerpt)

this talk is the memory sinkhole unleashing an x86 design flaw allowing for Universal privilege escalation with our speaker Christopher domas thanks all right uh good morning everyone thanks for coming out my name is Christopher domus I'm a cyber security researcher at a group called The Batel Memorial Institute it's a pretty cool place to work gives me a chance to do a lot of research Into The Fringe areas of cyber security that I wouldn't otherwise get to see but I what what I wanted to talk to you about today is um something I've been tinkering with in my free time for the last couple of months it's actually an x86 architectural vulnerability that allows privilege escalation it's been hidden on these processors for the last 20 years without anybody noticing it what it effectively does is open up an entirely new class of exploits on these processors and I want to talk about exactly how that's going to work but first I want to give a demonstration in order to sort of frame what we're going to see today so um this Dem is a little bit risky so instead of doing this on my actual presentation laptop I've got this little Netbook over here I love doing this deep vulnerability research on

On Hacker News

This is a thing and was used in this fantastic piece: [VIDEO] However the way they obtained these dumps is by going deep into debugger mode of the cpu which makes me doubt anything spooky would be going on. — sabas123, 2022-07
I can make an argument that money will make it even worse, as people will full-time make even more useless features that just increase the attack surface. This particular class of problems (same as the sqlite fts tokenizer exploit and most of openssl exploits, even lots of the sendmail exploits) are just obscure unused features. It happens even in CPUs themselves. (e.g. [VIDEO] ) Removing code is… — throwaway47292, 2021-12
I can imagine some ways to armor the branch predictor, similar in principle to how languages like Perl have to include a random seed in their hash code (in some circumstances) to avoid being able to pre-compute values that will all hash to the same thing [1]. There should be some ways to relatively cheaply periodically inject such a randomization into the prediction system enough to prevent that … — jerf, 2018-01
> adding the possibility to turn it off should suffice. How could Intel/AMD reasonably communicate this to customers and have it taken at face value? "Here's a flag to disable this black box we ship in every CPU. The product design and source code are proprietary, so please take our word for it that this flag disables everything." There was a blackhat talk on embedding malware in SMM and triggeri… — kogepathic, 2017-11
Chris Domas works at Battelle Memorial Institute. Battelle is a "non profit R&D house" that just so happens to hire "retiring" CIA operatives, and work on tons of CIA/NSA contracts. Completely coincidentally Chris Domas managed to discover the only Intel CPU backdoor ever discovered and publicized the very same year Intel already patched it [VIDEO] — rasz, 2021-06

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