How our voting system (and IRV) betrays your favourite candidate

Channel:The Center for Election Science · Length:3:34 · Published:2013-12-02 · Views:35047

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Summary

The Center for Election Science explains favorite betrayal in instant-runoff voting: in some elections, ranking your favorite first can cause your least favorite to win. It contrasts this with plurality voting's spoiler problem.

Why HN recommends it

The standard link in ranked-choice voting threads to show IRV does not eliminate the spoiler effect.

here's a video explaining the strategic voting issue — HN, 2021

Probability & game theory · US politics & elections

Subtitles (excerpt)

let's say there are two major parties in your city imagine that you like one better than the other so we're going to call them the good party and the bad party here's the good news the good party has a 10-point advantage in your city and wins most elections the bad news is that your city uses plurality voting and the upcoming election for mayor has three candidates and you really like the independent candidate this time even though he's your favorite choice you know you can't vote for him if he takes too many votes away from the good candidate that would cause the worst candidate to win wouldn't it be great if your City used a voting system that didn't have this problem how about instant runoff voting then you can vote for your favorite with instant runoff when your ideal candidate gets eliminated your vote moves over to help the good candidate win that's great right but what happens when your ideal candidate does even better what if he actually beats your second choice and your second choice gets eliminated unfortunately that puts us completely at the mercy of the voters that we have no control over those who voted for the good candidate and who did they put for their second choice it would be nice if they had

On Hacker News

RCV doesn't solve what is claimed in the article. It is interesting since countries that they give as examples are clear evidence of this. (Yes, I'm going to advocate cardinal systems like Approval, Range/Score, and STAR) > More moderate candidates. RCV doesn't encourage this at all. Australia is a clear example of this. In the house Liberal and Labor (the two major parties) control 85% of seats.… — godelski, 2021-06
I agree with what /u/zestyping says in the other comment, so I won't repeat it. But here's a video explaining the strategic voting issue: [VIDEO] Also, wikipedia has an example of a non-monotonic result here: [LINK] — elihu, 2021-06
I always recommend this pair of videos when discussing STAR voting vs other alternative systems. The first video is an easy-to-follow explanation of how spoiler effects can happen in both plurality voting and IRV [1]. In the second [2], the guy who created Star voting applies Ka-Ping Yee's methods to Star voting and animates it side-by-side with alternative systems to show its performance. [1] [V… — user234683, 2019-10
This is a shorter video from the same source as the other reply that deals specifically with IRV: [VIDEO] >Unless I misunderstand IRV, there is no "vote stealing" due to your vote automatically dropping off to your next-preferred candidate. The problem is that they drop to your next preferred candidate who has not been eliminated . If you're thinking about the problems that occur with plurality v… — aninhumer, 2016-11
This issue has been solved by math PhD's and political scientists who've studied the matter for decades. www.electology.org/approval-voting-vs-irv IRV can elect X even if Y was preferred to X by an arbitrarily huge majority and got more first-place votes than X. www.electology.org/core-support Regarding favorite betrayal, you might enjoy this video. [VIDEO] — ClayShentrup, 2014-11

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